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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSERVATION
RULES IN WISCONSIN
DONALD E.

BOLES*

GENERAL METHODS OF OBTAINING REVIEW

One of the most complicated aspects of the administrative process
insofar as administrative rules are concerned relates to the scope and
methods of judicial review. The subject of judicial review with all of
its many facets is too complex to submit to a detailed discussion regarding its operation on administrative rules generally in Wisconsin in this
study.' It may be said, however, that the adoption of the state's first
administrative procedure act in 1943 appears to have incorporated the
legislative intent to abolish the multiplicity of statutes authorizing a
variety of review procedures for the several state agencies. In place of
the diversity existing prior to 1943-there were 74 separate statutes
establishing procedures for judicial review-the first administrative
procedure act sought to establish a uniform procedure for judicial
2
review of administrative decisions in Wisconsin.
There are a variety of possibilities which judicial proceedings to
review an administrative decison may take. First, in actions to enforce
a rule the validity of the rule may be determined by the courts.3 A

slight variation on this point are statutory injunction proceedings which

4
are also available for the enforcement of many state agencies' rules.

The validity of rules clearly can be attacked in such proceedings. Moreover, the validity of a rule may be attacked in actions between private
parties in the event the defendant raises and seeks to have determined
the validity of a rule at issue in the case. 5 Another method by which
* B.S., M.S., University of Wisconsin; Research Assistant, Wisconsin Legislative

Council, 1953-1955; Research Associate, Wisconsin Conservation Department,
1955; Instructor in Government, Iowa State College, 1955; Author of WIScONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT ON HIGHER EDUCATION.

1 The role of judicial review as it applies to each of 46 Wisconsin agencies is
summarized in: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, INTERIM REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIvE RULE MAKING, No. I and II; LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, LIMITATIONS ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION,

2

May 27, 1954; WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, Ch. IV.
For a discussion of this point see: R. Hoyt, The Wisconsin Administrative

ProcedureAct, 1944 Wis. L. REV. 214 (1944). The Wisconsin Supreme Court

quotes Mr. Hoyt's conclusions with approval in Muench v. Public Service

3

Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
See: State v. Sorenson, 218 Wis. 295, 260 N.W. 662 (1935).

4 See: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, LIMITATIONS ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, May 27, 1954, p. 4 .

5 See for an example of such proceedings: Verbeten v. Huettl, 253 Wis. 510, 34

N.W.2d 803 (1948), where the issue of negligence turned on the fact of com-

pliance or non-compliance with a school bus regulation issued jointly by the
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the validity of a rule may be attacked is through action to restrain
enforcement of the rule. While this method has been used successfully
in the past, 6 the Wisconsin legislative council committee on administrative rule making found it difficult to determine whether this type of
proceeding has been superceded by the declaratory judgment procedures
outlined in Wis. STATS. (1953) Section 227.05. 7
One of the most far reaching methods by which the validity of
administrative rules can be reviewed by the courts is outlined in Wis.
STATS. (1953) Sections 227.16 to 228.21. In certain situations the
validity of an administrative decision relating to a particular person
sometimes depends on the validity of an underlying rule. It is essential,
in such a case, to determine the validity of the rule prior to the determination of the validity of the particular decision. Procedures by which
a rule may be reviewed in such a situation are outlined in the statutory
sections just noted. In at least one case,8 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
assumed without discussing the question that the validity of an underlying rule could be determined in the same proceeding in which the
validity of an administrative decision is tested.
Traditionally, the method of obtaining the type of review just mentioned was by one of the so-called "common law extraordinary writs"
-certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus and quo warranto.
Though common law writs are preserved by the Wisconsin Constitution 10 and thus cannot be abolished by legislation, the staff of the legislative council committee on administrative rule making concluded that,
Motor Vehicle Department and the Department of Public Instruction. In this
case, however, the validity of the rule was not attacked.
190, 256 N.W. 922 (1933).
See also: Corsvet v. Bank of Deerfield, 220 Wis. 209, 263 N.W. 687 (1936),
- where in an action against the bank on certificates of deposit, a depositor attacked a stabilization agreement which had been approved by the banking commission and which affected all despositors.

6 See: Modern System Dentists v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Wis.
190, 256 N.W. 922 (1933).
7Compare: WIscoNsIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIvE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, p. 120, and WIScoNsIN LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, LIMrrATIONS ON AD-

MINISTRATIVE DiscREToN IN RULE MAKING, May 1954, p. 3.
8 Gray Well Drilling Co. v. Board of Health, 263 Wis. 417, 58 N.W.2d 64 (1953).

Many writers have criticized the use of these remedies because the decision in
a case frequently turns on the correctness of the remedy pursued rather than
on the merits of the case. See for example: K. C. Davis, Administrative Law,
St. Paul, 1951, pp. 718-720; Larson, Administrative Regulations and the Extraordinary Writs in the State of Washington, 20 WAsH. L. REv. 768 (1945);
McGoveney, The California Chaos in Court Review of the Decisions of State
Administrative Agencies, 15 So. CALIF. L. REv. 775 (1942) ; WiscoNsni LEcasLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADmINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, Vol. II, Part II,
December 1954, p.119; G. R. Haas, The Use of Mandamus to Review Adnuinistrative Actions in New York, 4 BUFFALO L. REv. 334 (1955) ;-Note, Judicial
Review of Administrative Action in Florida-Certiorari,2 MIAbI L. Q. 181
(1947); Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions in Florida-Quo
Warranto, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 229 (1948).
1o WIs. CONST. Art. VII, §§3 & 8.
9
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there is little doubt that the procedures prescribed by Chap-

ter 227 for review of administrative decisions (as distinguished
from that prescribed for review of rules) was intended to be the
exclusive method of review.""
The procedures spelled out in Sections 227.16 to 227.21 may be
summarized briefly. Section 227.16 defines the type of person who is
entitled to seek judicial review and goes on to explain the form and
the method of serving a petition instituting review proceedings. The
agency and all parties to the proceedings have the right to participate
in the proceedings for review. The Circuit Court of Dane County
which has jurisdiction in such cases (unless other statutes specify a
different place of review) is granted the discretionary power to permit
other parties to intervene. Section 227.17 provides that the institution
of proceedings for review shall not stay enforcement of the agency
decision, but permits the reviewing court to order a stay upon such
terms as it deems proper. Section 227.18 outlines the method for
handling the record of the proceedings and authorizes the court to
permit subsequent corrections or additions in the record. Section 227.19
explains the methodology for presenting additional evidence prior to
the trial, sets a minimum time before the trial may be held and outlines
demurrer procedures and procedures for amending the petition.
Of special interest is Section 227.20 which spells out the scope of
review. It provides that the review is to be conducted by the court
without a jury and is to be confined to the record except for certain
cases of alleged irregularities in procedures before the agency. The
court may affirm, reverse or modify the agency's decision if the "substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced" as a result of
administrative findings or conclusions which are: (1) contrary to constitutional rights and privileges (2) ultra vires (3) made or promulgated upon unlawful procedure (4) arbitrary or capricious (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in the entire record. Section 227.21
permits any party to appeal the judgment of the circuit court to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and lists the procedures to be followed.
Finally, Section 227.22 merely excepts certain actions of the board of
tax appeals and the department of taxation from the procedures outlined above. The procedures just discussed have not been altered and
were not intended to be altered by the 1955 Administrative Procedure
Act.

12

21 See: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, p.119. See also: Hoyt, op. cit. Compare, however, these views with those found in: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, LIMrrATIONS ON ADMINIS2
TRATIvE DISCRETION, May 1954, p. .

12 This was also the conclusion of the staff of the legislative council committee

on administrative rule making when this writer discussed the matter with them.
For a discussion of the problem of substantial evidence see: Note, The Status
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

Provisions Prior to 1955. Of primary concern in a discussion of

judicial review of administrative rules are the declaratory judgment
proceedings outlined in Wis. STATS. (1953) 227.05.3

This may be

considered the last and probably the major method (theoretically at
least) by which the validity of rules may be reviewed by courts. Proponents of declaratory judgment proceedings in administrative law
have emphasized the speed, economy and efficiency of such procedures.
Opponents, on the other hand, are concerned about the fact that the
provisions of the Model Administrative Procedure Act on this subject
(which were adopted in Wis. STATS. (1953) Section 227.05) allowdeclaratory judgments to be rendered without prior resort to administrative remedies. Such practices, it was thought, might result in moot
or hypothetical questions being decided under conditions disadvantageous to the agency.' 4 However, after the Wisconsin legislative council committee on administrative rule making had concluded its study of
Wisconsin agencies-which included an investigation of the effects of
judicial review procedures-the committee concluded that there was
little available information as to how the declaratory judgment provision has worked in Wisconsin. 5 The only case specifically involvingthis provision to reach the state supreme court was dismissed when the
court found that the petitioners did not have any standing to challenge
the rule in question. 16
of SubstantialEvidence, 3 INTRA L. REv. 43 (1954) ; M. B. Parsons, Substantiar
Evidence Rule in Florida,6 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 481 (1953) ; Ultra vires action
is discussed in: S. A. DeSmith, LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: STATUTORY DisCRETION AND THE DOCrINE OF ULTRA VIRES, MODERN L. REV. 306 (1948). See
also: Note, Noncompliance with the APA as Reversible Error,6 STANFORD L.
REV. 693 (1954).
"13The Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in urging the
inclusion of such a provision in the Model Administrative Procedure Act stated
that, "Certain impediments including the judicial requirement of an actual case
or controversy and the doctrine of prior resort to administrative remedies have
developed to prevent [the Uniform Declaratory Acti from having the general
utility that is to be desired." See: Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1943, pp. 235-236.
14 For a summary of the arguments for and against the provisions of the declaratory judgment act as adopted in Wisconsin see: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE.
COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, pp. 116-117.
For a general discussion of the role of declaratory judgments in administrative law see: Davis, op. cit. pp. 729-732; G. Borchard, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 139 (1933); Note, Scope of
JudicialReview of Administrative Action, 28 PHIL. L. J. 572 (1953) ; Note, Developinent in the Law--Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787 (1949) ;
U. A. Lavery, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 35 CH. B_
REc. 295 (1954) ; G. J. Borrie, ADVANTAGES OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 18 MODERN L. REv. 138 (1955).
15

See:

WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, p.17. It was thought, however, that

some confusion appears to have resulted in practice because §227.05 speaks in.
terms of a "petition" rather than an "action" for a declaratory judgment.
'6 Hecker v. Gunderson, 245 Wis. 655, 15 N.W.2d 788 (1944).
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The provision of the statutes outlining declaratory judgment proceedings on rules prior to 1955 may be briefly summarized. This
section'1 provided that the validity of any rule could be determined by
petition for declaratory judgment addressed to the Dane County Circuit
Court except where the statutes specifically provided otherwise. The
court was authorized to render a declaratory judgment only if it appeared from the petition or the evidence that the rule or its threatened
application interfered with or threatened to interfere with the legal
rights and privileges of the petitioner. A declaratory judgment could
be rendered whether or not the petitioner had first requested the agency
to pass upon the validity of the questioned rule. The section then
pointed out that in rendering judgment, the court should give effect to
any pertinent:
"(a) constitutional limitations upon the powers of the agency;
(b) statutory limits upon the authority of the agency; (c) if the
rule in question is an interpretative rule, the limits of correct
interpretation; and (d) statutory requirements concerning rule
making procedures."
Finally, it provided that when a decision concerning the validity of
a rule required a decision upon an issue of fact concerning the applicability of the rule to the petitioner, after deciding the pertinent question,
the court must refer the case to the agency for a determination of the
fact issue under the section of the statutes dealing with declaratory
rulings. 8 Thereafter, the court's review of the agency determination
is to be had in a manner prescribed for declaratory rulings.
Problems Caused by the Original Provisions. One problem that
confronted the Wisconsin legislative council rule making committee
regarding declaratory judgment proceedings as a means of judicial review of rules was whether the proceedings just outlined were intended
to be the exclusive method of judicial review of rules.' The statute is
ambiguous in this respect. The state supreme court seems to have developed a general doctrine to the effect that when a statutory procedure
for appeal from administrative action is prescribed, that procedure
must be followed to the exclusion of other remedies. 20 This doctrine,
however, appears to have been discussed primarily in relation with
review of administrative decisions rather than specifically to rules.
(1953) §227.05.
Is Declaratory ruling procedures are outlined in Wis.
17 WIS. STATS.

19 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,

1955 Report,

STATS.

(1953) §227.06.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING,

Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, pp. 117-118; WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
1955 Report, ADMINIsTRATIVE RULE MAKING, Vol. II, Part I, December 1954,
pp. 7-8.
20 See: Munninghoff v. Conservation Commission, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712
(1948) ; Perkins v. Peacock, 263 Wis. 644, 58 N.W.2d 536 (1953) ; City of Superior v. Committee on Water Pollution, 263 Wis. 23, 56 N.W.2d 501 (1953) ;
State ex rel. Russel v. Board of Appeals of the Village of Prairie du Sac, 250
Wis. 394, 27 N.W.2d 378 (1947).
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Moreover, there is some indication that the doctrine is not without
exceptions. In Perkins v. Peacock, for example, a case involving the
validity of an order by a county school committee consolidating school
districts, the court said :21
"..
whether a statutory remedy of appeal is the exclusive
remedy of an aggrieved party to review jurisdictional defect in
procedure, or abuse of statutory power, depends upon legislative
intent as construed by the courts, and whether such right of
appeal is adequate to permit review of such matter...
"Even in those cases wherein this court has construed a
statutory right of appeal as being intended by the legislature to
be the exclusive remedy for reviewing jurisdictional defects in
procedure, there may be exceptional cases where such right of
appeal would be inadequate for such purpose and certiorari
might lie,-for example, where statutory notice was not given
and the aggrieved party did not receive actual notice until the
time for appeal had expired."
The legislative council committee on administrative rule making
concluded after a study of the notes to the drafts of the Model Administrative Procedure Act (on which the Wisconsin provision is
based) and of records of the Wisconsin legislature, that it is not clear
whether or not the legislature intended the proceeding spelled out in
Wis. STATS. (1953) Section 227.05 to be the exclusive method of
obtaining judicial review of rules. 22 The committee, therefore, recommended a revision of that section to clarify the various forms of proceedings in which the validity of a rule may be reviewed. 23 The
recommendation was incorporated in the newly adopted Administrative
Procedure Act.24
Provisions of the Revised Procedure Act. The new section provides
that with the exception of a few specified situations, the exclusive
means of judicial review of the validity of a rule shall be a declaratory
judgment action brought in the Circuit Court of Dane County. The
agency whose rule is involved must be the party defendant in such
cases. After outlining the procedures to be followed in delivering a
summons in such an action, the new section repeats the provision of
its predecessor which states that such a judgment shall be rendered only
if the court determines that the rule or its theatened application interferes with legal rights and privileges of the plaintiff. Declaratory
judgments under the new law may be rendered whether or not the
plaintiff has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the
21263 Wis. at 658.
22

WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATVE RULE MAKING,

Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, p. 118.

23
24

See: WISCONSIN LEGIsLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, AnMmisTRATrvE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 7-8.
Wis. LAWS 1955, c. 221, §227.05.
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rule in question. The new section also changes the provision of the
earlier law in cases where an issue of fact is raised concerning the
applicability of a rule to a party 25 so that now the cases shall be
referred by the court to the agency issuing the rule before rather than
after the court has decided on the pertinent legal questions. Review of
agency action, following the declaratory ruling is now specifically
placed under the provisions of Section 227.20.
The new section, moreover, specifies that the validity of a rule may
be determined in any of the following judicial proceedings :28
(a) Any civil proceeding by the state or any officer or agency
thereof to enforce a statute or to recover thereunder, provided such proceeding is not based upon a matter as to
which the opposing party is accorded an administrative
review or a judicial review by other provisions of the
statutes and such opposing party has failed to exercise
such right to review so accorded;
(b) Criminal prosecutions;
(c) Proceedings or prosecutions for violation of county or
municipal ordinances;
(d) Habeas corpus proceedings relating to criminal prosecutions ;
(e) Proceedings under §§227.15 to 227.21 for review of decisions and orders of administrative agencies provided the
validity of the rule involved was duly challenged in the
proceeding before the agency in which the order or decision
sought to be reviewed was made or entered.
Another portion of the new law27 provides that in any judicial
proceedings other than those relating to declaratory judgments just
outlined, where the invalidity of a rule is material to the cause of
action, the assertion of such invalidity must be set forth in the pleading
of the party raising this issue. Within 30 days after the service of
the pleading in which the invalidity of a rule is asserted, the party
making the assertion must apply to the court for an order suspending
the trial or such proceedings until after a determination of the validity
of the rule at issue is made in an action for a declaratory judgment.
The procedures to be followed in such declaratory judgment proceedings are next spelled out in detail. It is important to note, that the
failure to set forth the invalidity of the rule in a pleading or to commence a declaratory judgment proceeding, "within a reasonable time"
pursuant to such an order of the court shall preclude a party from
asserting or maintaining that such a rule is invalid.
25

The new provision is also more far-reaching than the earlier one in regard to

28

the situations encompassed. It states, "Whenever an issue of fact is raised
concerning the applicability of a rule to a party or affecting the validity or
proper interpretation of a rule . . . (Emphasis added to indicate the addition
made by the new law). See: Wis. LAWS 1955, c. 221, §227.05(2).
Wis. LAWS 1955, c. 221, §227.05 (3).

27

Ibid., §227.05 (4).
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This section concludes with a provision noting that in any action
under the section relating to review of rules, the court shall declare
the rule invalid if it finds the rule violates constitutional provisions, is
ultra vires, or was adopted without compliance with statutory rule
making procedures.
It was the conclusion of the committee on administrative rule
making of the legislative council that action for declaratory judgments
in the Circuit Court of Dane County will be the primary method of
review under the new law. 28 The new law, however, the committee
pointed out, also makes clear that a rule may be reviewed in other
proceedings if the validity of the rule is a material issue in that proceeding. The committee offered as an example of this type of proceeding the case of a person who is charged in a criminal action with
violating a rule. Such a person clearly can contest the validity of the
rule in that action the committee asserted.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSERVATION

RULES

The general procedures regarding judicial review just outlined
apply to actions of the Wisconsin conservation commission. One exception to these general procedures, however, is the statute which provides that rules affecting fish and game seasons are subject to review
as provided in Chapter 227 except that if the rule affects only the
county in which the appellant resides, the appeal shall be to the circuit
court of such county. 29 It has been previously explained that normally

agency rules are subject to review by the Dane County Circuit Court.
While the term "order" in this section has been changed to the word
"rule" (as is true in all statutes dealing with the conservation rule
making process )the 1955 Administrative Procedure Act makes no
change in the statute regarding rules dealing with fish and game seasons which affect only the county in which the appellant resides.30
Several facets of conservation rule making procedures have come
under the scrutiny of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. It is rather
surprising, however, considering the far-reaching nature of conservation rules that judicial review has not played a more important part
than has been the case. Moreover, in several of the cases in which the
state supreme court had an opportunity to decide important procedural
quesions regarding various aspects of the conservation rule making
process and closely related matters the court's opinions have done little
to clear up the ambiguity in the statute law.
The Krenz Case. Certain provisions of the act creating the present conservation commission and delegating to it licensing authority
28

WISCONsIN LEGIsLAxnvE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING,

Vol. II, Part I, December, 1954, p. 8.

29Wis. STATS. (1953) §29.174(8).
30 See: Wis. LAws 1955, c. 221, §29.174(8).
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and limited rule making powers-' was reviewed by the supreme court
the year following its enactment in Krenz v. Nichols. 32 Representatives of the conservation department note, and the lawyer's briefs in
the case indicate that one of the key issues in the case was considered
to be the validity of the legislature's delegating rule making and
licensing powers to an administrative agency. The opinion of the
court, however, makes relatively little of the delegation issue, although
the authority of the commission to license and regulate private muskrat
farms is clearly upheld.
In overruling the trial court's holding that the statute authorizing
the commission to license and regulate private muskrat farms 33 was
invalid the state supreme court enunciated a most significant rule regarding conservation regulation in Wisconsin. The State of Wisconsin,
the court pointed out, holds title to the wild animals in trust for the
people. No individual has any title to any such animal until he reduces
it to lawful possession. As a trustee, the court explained, the state
may conserve wildlife and regulate or prohibit its taking in any reasonable way it may deem necessary for the public welfare so long as it
does not violate any organic law of the land. 34 The court then concluded that the section of the statutes authorizing the commission to
license and regulate private muskrat farms was not contrary to any
provision of either the state or the national constitutions. Since the
statute was intended to conserve trust property, the court reasoned, it
35
should be given a liberal construction to conserve its validity.
While the court in the Krenz case did not give a detailed rationale
of its attitudes specifically regarding the rule making authority of the
commission, in a series of later cases the court uniformly upheld the
rule making powers of the commission against the charge that it constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. These
cases also indicate the variety of legal techniques used to obtain judicial
review of conservation commission rules.
The Sorenson Case. The leading case involving the rule making
36
authority of the conservation commission is State v. Sorenson. Here
31

See: Wis. LAWS 1927, c. 426.
Wis. 394, 222 N.W. 300 (1928).

32197

33 WIs. STATS. (1927) §29.575.
34

35

197 Wis. at 400.

Similar reasons were advanced by the court two years later in upholding a law

establishing fishing regulations on Lake Michigan against the charge that it

violated the state's constitutional provision that local laws must encompass only
one subject and that subject must appear in the title of the law. The court held
that laws are not merely local within the meaning of the constitution when the
subject thereof is such that the state itself has an interest therein as a proprietor or as a trustee or in its governmental capacity for the benefit or in the
interests of the general public. See: Monka v. Conservation Commission, 202
Wis. 39 (1930).
36218 Wis. 295, 260 N.W. 662 (1935).
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the defendent was charged with violating a rule of the commission37
establishing a bag limit on various species of fish taken from the
Mississippi River where it forms a boundary of the State of Wisconsin. Using the arguments set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in the Panama Refining Company case, 8 the defendant argued
that this rule constituted an illegal delegation of legislative authority
in that sufficient standards limiting the authority of the commission
were not established. The court, however, after pointing out that the
order resulted from an agreement reached at a joint conference with
representatives of the conservation departments of Minnesota and
Wisconsin, threw out the defendant's contention and listed the standards which limit the authority of the commission.
First, the court noted that the statute under which the rule was
promulgated 9 restricted the commission to adopting rules affecting
boundary waters as a result of joint action with officials of the other
states involved. The second, and more general standard limiting the
authority of the commission, the court explained, was to be found
in Wis. STATS. (1933) Section 23.09. This section stated that the
purpose of the conservation act which delegated wide rule making
powers to the commission was for the "protection, development and
use of fish and game in the state." These, the court felt, were sufficiently definite standards. Moreover, the court refused to be convinced that these rules were arbitrary, unlawful and unreasonable
inasmuch as the joint action of both Wisconsin and Minnesota in
adopting the same rule was aimed at establishing uniformity.
The Olson Case. Five years later the supreme court in Olson v.
Conservation Commission4 ° was again asked to rule on the validity of
commission rules adopted under the same statute at issue in the
Sorenson case. In the Olson case, however, a different technique was
utilized to obtain judicial review of a commission rule, for it involved
an action to restrain the commission from enforcing a rule41 regulating
the size of nets used by commercial fishermen in interstate waters.
The case came to the supreme court on appeal from an action of
the Dane County Circuit Court sustaining a demurrer of the commission.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court again pointed out that the legislature had provided sufficient standards when it delegated rule making
authority to the commission in this area. Varying slightly from the
words of the court in the Sorenson case, the court here stated that the
3

7 Rule No. M-4 (1935).
- Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

39

40
41

Wis. STATs. (1933) §29.085.

235 Wis. 473, 293 N.W. 262 (1940).
Rule No. F-405 (1940).
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standard to which the authority of the commission rules must conform
was, "to conserve the fish and game supply." Moreover, the court
stated summarily, the commission rule was not unreasonable or
unjust.
In answering a series of other contentions raised against the rule,
the court held that a rule regulating net sizes is not class legislation
inasmuch as it applied to all commercial fishermen. It was further
contended that since the order applied to licensed commercial fishermen, and since the fishermen had been licensed prior to the adoption
of the rule which reduced the size of nets previously in use, the rule
constituted an impairment of a contract. (Under the new rule, nets
which had been legally licensed before were made an illegal method
of taking fish.) The court held, however, that a license is not a contract, and that the legislature or its delegated agent can alter or revoke
such a license even though the fishermen had purchased the license
and it had not expired before the adoption of new regulations affecting
the licensee. The petitioner must have been aware of the fact that
license provisions can be changed, the court believed.
The court also held without discussing the point that the commission rule did not deny equal protection of the laws. Furthermore,
merely because the fisherman must abandon some equipment as a
result of the new order does not mean he has been denied due process
of law the court reasoned in answering another contention. Finally,
in response to the argument that the rule violated Wis. STATS. (1939)
Section 29.174(12) by changing penalties established by statutes, the
court ruled that the petitioner had no standing to maintain that the
commission had changed the penalty since the petitioner had not been
42
charged with violation of this or any other commission rule.
The Winkler Case. The other major case specifically involving
the rule making authority of the conservation commission to come
before the state supreme court involved a commission rule 43 making it
unlawful for any person to carry or to have in possession any rifle
other than a .22 caliber rimfire in specified deer country during the
closed season on deer. 44 The defendant was charged with violating
the order. The jury found that the defendant while guilty of the facts
alleged did not intend to use the gun in an illegal fashion, whereupon
42 Tfe conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in both the Sorenson and the
Olson cases were adopted by the federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin in a case with a similar fact situation involving the director of
the Wisconsin conservation department. Here the court also held that even if
Wisconsin conservation officials acted in an arbitrary and oppressive fashion
in inspecting plaintiff's fishing craft on the Great Lakes, the federal District
Court would not have jurisdiction over the controversy. See: LeClair v. Swift,
43 76 F.Supp. 729 (1948).
Rule No. M40 (Rev. 5) (1948).
44 State v. Winkler, 255 Wis. 352, 38 N.W.2d 471 (1949).
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the trial court held that the commission rule would not apply if no
intent to hunt was established. Moreover, the trial court held that the
order would be unreasonable if it was meant to apply where no intent
to violate the closed season rule was established.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in reversing noted that the validity
of delegating legislative authority to the conservation commission had
been upheld in the Sorenson case. It went on to hold that the rule in
point here had been violated by the defendant's mere carrying of a
prohibited gun under the circumstances without any intent to use the
gun for hunting at the time in question. It is evident, the court said,
that carrying or transporting of prohibited fire arms during the closed
season evidently constitutes the most material or important element of
the offense defined by the order. On the other hand, it was pointed out,
the intent to hunt is not stated to be or to constitute an essential element of the offense defined by the order, nor is there any basis therein
for deeming the absence of proof of such an intent a defense when
a violation is charged. The trial court's finding' that there was no
45
intent, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded, was immaterial.
The Munninghoff Case. One further case concerning the conservation commission must be noted, for while it does. not specifically involve the rule making authority of the commission, it does cast some
light on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's views regarding judicial
review procedures set forth in Wisconsin's 1943 Administrative Procedure Act. The case involved the powers of the commission to issue
private fur farm licenses and as such might normally be considered
as an example of a "contested case" action within the meaning of
Wis. STATS. (1953) Section 227.01(3) rather than a case involving
rule making. It is also noteworthy as an example of a case in which
the holding of the court struck down an administrative action in an area
where the court has normally been most willing to permit wide leeway
to the agency. As such, the decision of the court still causes consternation among various elements in the Wisconsin Conservation Department.
The fact situation in the Munninghoff case46 as outlined by the
supreme court is especially noteworthy. Munninghoff petitioned the
commission for a license to operate a private, muskrat farm on the
backwaters of the Wisconsin River. Following its normal procedures,
the commission foxmally voted on the question of whether such a
license. should, be granted. A tabulation of the yotes revealed that the
45 For a recent attorney"general's opinion upholding the constitutionality of the'

legislature's -dejegation of rule making powers to the commission as contained
in Wis. STATS. (1951) §§23.09(7), 29.174(2), 29.174(9), see: 41 Ops. Aerr'y

46

GEN. 256 (1952).

Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Commission, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d
712 (1948):

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

commission was equally divided 3 to 3 on the issue, whereupon the
commissioners requested the department director to make the decision.
The director ruled to refuse the license and the license was refused
by the commission.
Petitioner then started review proceedings under Chapter 227 of
the statutes-the Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act-in the
Circuit Court of Dane County. The commission demurred on the
ground that the statutes governing the conservation commission do
not provide for administrative review of a denial of a license. The
demurrer, however, was overruled. The parties then stipulated that
this action could be considered as one for mandamus under Chapter
293, or as an action for a declaratory judgment under Section 269.56
or as an administrative review, whichever ultimately might be determined to be proper.
The trial court held, however, that it was not obliged or permitted
to be bound by the stipulation. The petition, Circuit Court Judge
Alvin Reis flatly held, is under the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act, for where a statute provides the method for judicial review, as
does Section 227.15 there is no other means available. Moreover, the
court stated, there was no need for a declaratory judgment for the
court was rendering an
"... out-and-out judgment on the basis of the petition and that is
that the director's order denying a license should be reserved
on two grounds, at least, as they appear in Section 227.20."
These grounds were, the court noted, that the action was ultra vires
and that it was unsupported by substantial evidence.
While the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Munninghoff case is a lengthy one, almost no space is devoted to a discussion
of the important procedural problems of judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The court held merely that a decision
of the conservation commission denying an application for a muskrat
farm license under Section 29.575 is subject to judicial review under
Wis. STATS. (1947) Section 227.15. Inasmuch as the court made no
attempt to present a rationale for this holding it might be assumed that
the reasoning of the circuit court was adopted on this point. Because
of the absence of discussion by the supreme court on the problem of
judicial review, however, this case has been a source of some bewilderment to the conservation department counsel and to the representative
of the attorney general's office assigned to the conservation commission.
Their feeling appears to be that the application of the rule on this point
must be restricted to the specific fact situation involved in the Mu-nninghoff case.
The Grange Case. Before concluding a discussion of judicial re-
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view of conservation rules it is necessary to take notice of Grange V.
Conservation Commisson.4 7 This case, while never reaching the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, is noteworthy in that it raises a series
of unique points regarding the commission's rule making procedures
and methods of obtaining judicial review of its rules. Moveover, the
pre-trial maneuvering is of particular interest.
Grange petitioned the court to utilize the authority granted it
under Section 227.15 to reverse a rule48 of the conservation commission establishing a controlled waterfowl hunting season on the
Horicon marsh which is a federal wildlife refuge. The commission
rule resulted from joint action with the federal authorities acting under
provisions of the federal Migratory Bird Act. 49 Under this provision
the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to open, up to 25 percent
of any federal refuge, to hunting. The briefs in the case, however,
indicate that a major concern of both parties was with procedural
problems of rule making by the commission and the proper techniques
to be used in obtaining judicial review of the commission's rules.
In the pre-trial action, assistant attorney general Roy Tulane,
counsel for the commission, moved to dismiss the case if the petitioner
insisted upon proceeding under Section 227.15 on the grounds that
there was no statutory authority to use such proceedings for the review
of an agency's rule as defined in Section 227.01(2) of the statutes. In
the first instance, the attorney general felt that the case should be
brought on a federal level under the federal Administrative Procedure
Act, for if this procedure was not followed the petitioner would not be
exhausting his administrative remedies. Secondly, however, counsel
for the commission noted, even if it were conceded that the case might
originate in a state court, action should be brought under the declaratory judgment provision of Chapter 22750 rather than under Section
227.15.
The petitioner, in addition to seeking review of the commission
order under Section 227.15, also moved that the conservation commission be "compelled to adopt rules for its own procedure, (and)
pleadings before it, . . . as required by Wis. STATS. (1953) Section
227.08. This approach apparently resulted from the adverse interrogation of then-conservation director Ernest Swift in a pre-trial hearing
before a court commissioner after Swift's replies indicated that the
commission had not conformed to statutory requirements in adopting
such rules.
In its Ruling on Motions, the court had some interesting observa93 Dane County Cir. Ct. 179 (1954).
Rule No. AGB-824(Sec. 5).
49 16 U.S.C.A. 718 D (a).
50 Wis. STATS. (1953) §227.05.
47
48
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tions to make regarding methods of reviewing rules and the conservation rule making process in general. Speaking first of the motion seeking to compel the commission to adopt rules, the court felt that in the
present case it was not a timely way to challenge the commission's
failure to do its duty. The proceediihgs before the commission were
past, the court noted, and the order to which objection was taken had
been issued. "The horse is gone," the court said, "it will not help
petitioners in this case to lock the stable door now." 51 The court
thought it would be appropriate, and criticism of the commission
doubtlessly would be avoided, if the commission adopted rules for its
own procedures, "to the extent that such rules are practicable." 52
"Ordinarily," the court explained, "rules are necessary only in adversary proceedings but they can be desirable as a prerequisite also to
general orders." In a most curious bit of reasoning the court then
stated:
"However, the legislature has commanded the agency

. . .

to

adopt rules. We quaere whether any court should superimpose
a court edict and consequent punishment for contempt in the
event of disobedience....
"The legislature has made its mandate. If the commissioners
flagrantly are violating it, there is power in the executive to
remove them. 53 We are not sure that this is any of the court's
business; but, in any event, we are sure that petitioners in the
precise case at bar are not entitled to a court order that the
conservation commission shall adopt rules for myriad proceedings and preliminary to its host of orders-particularly when
the particular order in dispute ...

has already been issued."

The petitioner's motion was thus denied by a stroke of logic which
seems to imply that a court has not authority to compel an agency
created by statute to abide by other statutes governing the agency's
conduct.
The court concluded its Ruling on Motions by adopting a liberal
view regarding the problem as to whether the petitioner should have
brought action under Section 227.05 or under Section 227.15. If it
is fatal that petitioner was asking for review and setting aside, instead
of a declaratory judgment, the court could so hold when the matter
came before it on review, the court explained. Moreover, it occurred
to the court that even if it was held that petitioners should have asked
51
52
53

It might, of course, be argued that a great bulk of commission contemplated
action regarding rule making still remained in the stable.
The statute, however, takes no account of practicability, but flatly requires an
agency to adopt such rules.
WIs. STATS. (1953) §23.09(2) provides only the manner of appointing commissioners and fixes their terms at six years. No provision establishing
methods of removal by the governor is there spelled out. However, Wis.
STATS. (1953) §17.07(3) provides that state officers appointed in the fashion of
the conservation commissioners may be removed at any time by the governor
for cause.
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for a declaratory judgment, "they perhaps can amend the 'Wherefore'
clause of their petition, without vitiating their petition." "What the
petitioner seeks, after all," the court concluded,
"is the court's declaration, judgment or order--call it what you
want-to the effect that section 5 of the commission's Horicon
Marsh order of September 17 is invalid. We will reach that
essential if and when it is brought before us."
With most of the significant procedural points disposed of prior
to the trial, the court's opinion in the case contains little of importance
from the standpoint of the rule making process. In answering the
charge that the commission's order was so indefinite as not to sufficiently advise the public as to the terms and conditions of the hunt,
the court merely noted that the state order was as definite as the
federal order from which it garnered its authority. While the "vagueness" argument might be raised in a criminal prosecution, the court
explained, it does not militate against the power of either the state
or the federal authorities to issue a "controlled hunt" order. Moreover, it does not create interests in these petitioners under Chapter 227.
If the federal order is "all wrong" the court concluded, it ought to be
challenged in a federal court. The Circuit Court of Dane County,
Judge Alvin Reis presiding, then held the federal order lawful and
affirmed the commission order.
THE COURT'S RoLE IN CONSERVATION RuLE MAKING

While the role of the courts in the conservation rule making
process is not completely clear, some conclusions may be drawn regarding certain facets of judicial review of conservation rules. First,
no rules promulgated by the commission have as yet been held invalid
by the supreme court. In those cases in which the validity of conservation rules have been challenged before the supreme court, that
court has sustained them against charges that they: (1) constituted
an illegal delegation of legislative authority (2) violated due process
of law (3) violated the equal protection of the laws (4) impaired
contractual obligations (5) were arbitrary and unreasonable (6) were
class legislation. Moreover, a rule incorporating the concept of strict
liability has been sustained when the court held that one might violate
a rule prohibiting carrying a rifle in deer country during the closed
season, even though no intent to violate the rule prohibiting the shooting of deer in the closed season was found.
The limited number of cases to come before the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in which the problem of judicial review of conservation
rules was involved afford some evidence that the court has accorded
a presumption of validity to such rules.54 For example, in the leading
54 This conclusion is also shared by the staff of the legislative council Committee
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case of State v. Sorenson,55 Chief Justice Rosenberry said for the
court:

"There are no facts appearing in the stipulation, nor are there
any facts of which the court can take judicial notice, upon which
it can be said that these rules and regulations are arbitrary and
unreasonable."
A variety of legal methods have been used to test the validity of
conservation rules before the courts of the state. In several instances
the validity of a rule has been determined in actions brought by the
commission to enforce rules and to impose penalties for non-compliance with them. 58 The validity of a conservation rule has also been
determined in statutory injunction proceedings. 57 Finally, the validity
of a conservation rule has been tested and sustained in proceedings to
review an administrative decision as spelled out in Sections 227.15 to
227.21 of the Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act.58 This action,
however, was permitted only by the Circuit Court of Dane County
and the supreme court has never specifically ruled on the permissibility
of this method of review of conservation rules although it did permit
this procedure in the area of a "contested case." 59 Interestingly enough,
the declaratory judgment proceedings outlined in the administrative
procedure act have never been used to check the validity of conservation rules although there is some evidence to indicate that such proceedings are regarded by a number of writers as being one of the
principal methods to be utilized for the review of agency rules. 0
A summary of the court decisions involving judicial review of conservation rules reveals the relatively unimportant role played by several
of the procedural or jurisdictional niceties often raised by courts in
other areas as barriers to a ruling on the substantive issues in a case.
For example, the courts have had little to say regarding the timing
of review or the so-called "exhaustion of administrative remedies"
concept in cases involving conservation rules. (Probably one of the
major reasons for the development of this doctrine was that it facilitates orderly procedures and avoids the delay and confusion which
would result if a case would be shifted back and forth between the
on Administrative Rule Making. See: WISCONSIN
TERIM REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING,

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, IN-

No. I, August 1953, pp. 91-92.

55 218 Wis. 295, 260 N.W. 662 (1935).
58 See: State v. Sorenson, 218 Wis. 295, 260 N.W. 662 (1935); State v. Winkler,
255 Wis. 352, 38 N.W.2d 471 (1949).
57 See: Olson v. Conservation Commission, op. cit.; LeClair v. Swift, op. cit.
,8 Grange v. Conservation Commission, 93 Dane County Cir. Ct. 179 (1954).
59 See: Muninghoff v. Conservation Commission, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712
60

(1948).
See: Davis, op. cit. pp. 748-750;

WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report,
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, pp. 116-118;
WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, LIMrTATIONs ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION, May 1954, pp. 2-4.
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court and the agency at every point in the proceedings.) It is true that
counsel for the commission raised the "exhaustion" argument in a
circuit court case61 but it was brushed aside with no discussion by the
court. While the state supreme court has never discussed the concept
been
in connection with rules of the conservation commission, it has
62
a concept recognized and applied by the court in other fields.
The 1955 Administrative Procedure Act like its predecessors, however, contains provisions dealing expressly with certain aspects of the
exhaustion doctrine. One section 63 provides that a declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested
the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in question. Moreover,
the section relating to review of administrative decisions 4 provides
that if a specific statutory provision requires a petition for rehearing
as a condition precedent to judicial review, review shall be afforded
only after such petition has been filed and determined.
Another procedural factor affecting the availability of judicial
review which has had little or no significance in respect to court decisions regarding conservation rules is the concept of "nonreviewability."
A considerable case law has been built up on this subject in federal
courts.6 5 Some examples of actions which have been held to be nonreviewable are an agency's exercise or failure to exercise its prosecuting power and various actions conferring or refusing to confer
special benefits. The Wisconsin legislative council committee on administrative rule making found, however, that the doctrine of "nonreviewability" seldom is invoked in connection with review of administrative rules in Wisconsin. 66 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, this
committee concluded, generally has based nonreviewability on the
ground that the action did not affect any legal right of the petitioner.
The one procedural factor affecting the availability of judicial
review of conservation rules which has been of some importance is
the concept of an individual's "standing to challenge" the rule in
question. The decisions in which such a point is at issue usually speak
61 Grange v. Conservation Commission, op. cit.
62

For a recent statement see: James Conroy Family Co. v. Milwaukee, 246 Wis.
258, 16 N.W.2d 814 (1944). The citations for other Wisconsin cases involving

this point may be found in Holz, Judicial Review of Quasi-Legislative Order,
1942 Wis. L. REv. 392 (1942); See also: WIscoNSIN LEGISLATIV COUNCIL,
1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954,
p. 125.
63 Wis. LAws 1955, c. 221, §227.05(1).
64 WIs. STATS. (1953) §227.15. This section is unaltered by the 1955 revision of
Chapter 227.
65 See: Davis, op. cit., pp. 812-865; See also: Davis, Unreviewable Administrative
Action, 15 FED. R.D. 411 (1954) ; S. A. DeSmith, Limits of fudicial Review:
Statutory Discretion and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 11 MODERN L. Ray. 306
(1948).
66
WiscoNsiN LEaGisATrvE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADmrISTRATIVE RULE MAKING,
Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, p. 127.
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in terms of absence of "legal right." It is difficult, however, to fashion
an exact definition of the concept of "legal right." In determining
whether the legal rights of the petitioner have been affected, the
courts normally give weight to factors such as the directness and
magnitude of the injury, the legislative policy, if any, regarding reviewability, the agency's judgment as to whether the person was sufficiently "interested" so as to be permitted to intervene in the proceedings before the agency.67
It is impossible to enunciate any general view adopted by the court
on this subject since the question is answered on a case-to-case basis.
For example, in the Olson case,6s the court ruled the petitioner had no
standing or "legal right" to maintain that a commission rule violated
a section of the statutes prohibiting rules from changing statutory
penalties since the petitioner had not been charged with the violation
of any rule. Moreover, in the Grange case 9 the Dane County Circuit
Court held that while the argument that a commission order was so
indefinite as not to sufficiently advise the public of the terms of a "controlled hunt" might be validly raised in a criminal prosecution, petitioner had no legal "interest" to raise this objection in a proceeding
to review agency action under Section 227.15 of the statutes.
SUMMARY

The relatively few cases in which the validity of conservation
commission rules have been challenged in the courts, while answering
some questions as to the scope and method of judicial review, have left
a number of significant questions unanswered. Several of the most
important might be briefly noted before concluding this discussion.
First, the courts have generally shied away from any attempt to outline, even in a rough way, the role of the declaratory judgment provision in the Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Act. The opportunity
to clarify the position of this type of action regarding conservation
rules presented itself in at least two cases 7' but the courts refused to
accept the challenge. As a result there is no case in which a declaratory
judgment affecting the validity of a conservation rule (or the rules
67 For a general discussion of "legal right" or standing to challenge see: Davis,

op. cit., pp. 676-717; Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39
MINN. L. REv. 353 (1955); WISCONSIN LaaIsLATmrE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATVE RULE MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, pp. 125-127;
WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAK-

ING, LIMITATIONS ON ADMINISTRATIVE DIScRION, May 1954, p. 8.
Olson v. Conservation Commission, op. cit.
69 Grange v. Conservation Commission, op. cit.
70 For recent cases, not specifically in the field of conservation in which "legal
right" or the standing to challenge concept is discussed see: Muench v. Public
Service Commission, 261 Wis. 429, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952); Hecker v. Gunder-

son, 245 Wis. 655, 15 N.W.2d 788 (1944).
71Munninghoff v. Conservation Commission and Grange v. Conservation Commission, op. cit.

1956]

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RULES

of any agency for that matter) has been issued. Thus the actual operation of this action, which some have considered to be one of the primary methods for the review of rules, remains shrouded in mystery
in Wisconsin.
Secondly, some of the most signifiicant problems raised in administrative law have concerned the distinction between legislative and
interpretative rules. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, has
never had the occasion to discuss this differentiation, insofar as conservation rules are concerned. Thus the problem of retroactive interpretative or legislative rules, which has been condemned by some
writers, has not plagued the process of judicial review of conservation rules.7 2 The absence of attempts by the court to differentiate between legislative and interpretative rules is understandable since the
distinction between the two types of rules often is an arbitrary and
difficult one. Up to this point, at least, the uncertainties in law created
by a court's attempt to distinguish between legislative and interpretative rules has been avoided in the field of Wisconsin Conservation.
The case law on Wisconsin conservation rules is also uninstructive
as to the court's views, concerning the reenactment doctrine. This
concept, which has been applied in a long series of federal cases
particularly in the tax field, 73 can be summarized to mean that the
reenactment of a statute is an implied legislative approval of administrative interpretations which may give the interpretation the force
of law. The only time reenactment is mentioned in a case involving the
regulatory powers of the conservation commission is in Munninghoff
v. Conservation Commission. However, it was used in a considerably
different manner there. The court held that the reenactment of a
statute on which there exists a judicial determination7 4 indicates a
legislative intent to adopt the judicial determination. 7 Thus no light
is cast upon the court's views of reenactment as it applies to administrative action.
Finally, little can be learned from the court decisions involving
conservation commission rules as to the scope of judicial review in
this area. Moreover, the legislative council committee on administra72 The theory of retroactivity is that a new interpretative rule which results from

judicial disapproval of a former interpretation operates retroactively, since it,
like a judicial decision construing a statute, merely purports to declare what
the statute has always meant.
For a discussion of legislative and interpretative rules and the resulting prob-

lem of retroactivity see: Davis, op. cit., pp. 184-229; Note, Retroactive Operation of Administrative Discretion, 60 HARV. L. REv. 627 (1947); WIscONSIN

LEsIsLATIvE COUNcIL, 1955 Report, ADiINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING, Vol. II,,
Part II, pp. 123-124; LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE MAKING, LIMITATIONS ON ADiMINISTRATIVE DIscRETION, May 1954, pp. 5-7.

7 For a summary of these cases see: Davis, op. cit., pp. 206-211.
4 In this instance the case alluded to was Krenz v. Nichols, 197 Wis. 394, 222
N.W. 300 (1928).
75255 Wis. at 258.
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tive rule making concluded that the case law generally in Wisconsin
is uninstructive on this point because prior to 1943, the scope of
review of administrative rules depended to a large extent on statutory
provisions which varied from one agency to the next and which were
repealed when the Administrative Procedure Act was first enacted in
1943.76

The most instructive materials concerning scope of judicial review
are probably several of the provisions in the Administrative Procedure
Act. Section 227.05(5) 77 provides that in a declaratory judgment
proceeding the court shall declare a rule invalid if it finds that it: (1)
violates constitutional provisions (2) exceeds the statutory authority of
the agency (3) was adopted without compliance with statutory rule
making procedures. The other section casting some light on the scope
of review provides that in review of administrative decisions :78
The court may affirm the decision of the agency, or may reverse
or modify it if the substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced as a result of the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusion or decision being:
(a) Contrary to constitutional rights or privileges; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the agency, or affected by other error in law; or
(c) Made or promulgated upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or
(e) Arbitrary or capricious.
It would seem that if the scope of review prescribed by Section
227.05 is proper in declaratory judgment proceedings, it should also
be proper in any other form of proceeding for judicial review of a
rule.79 It should also be noted that the primary difference between
the scope of review prescribed for administrative decisions and the
scope of review prescribed for administrative rules is that an administrative decision may be held to be void if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted, while no
comparable provision exists in Section 227.05(5) regarding the review
of rules. This is understandable, since in most cases rules are not
based on any official record of hearing or fact finding, particularly in
the field of conservation.
COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, pp. 121-122; For a discussion of the
scope of review as it affects agencies in other states see: I. Topper, Judicial

76See: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE

Review of Decisions of the Ohio Industrial Commission, 13 OIiO ST. L. J. 455
(1952); R. F. Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in Indiana,
28 IND. L. J. 293 (1953).
7 While the provisions of this subsection were shifted from subsection (3) to
subsection (5) by WIs. LAWS 1955, c. 221, the substance was not altered.
78 WIs. STATS. (1953) §227.20. This section was not altered by the 1955 revision
in the Administrative Procedure Act.
79 See: WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 1955 Report, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE
MAKING, Vol. II, Part II, December 1954, p. 122.

